Books:
Rule by Multiple Majorities: A New Theory of Popular Control (Cambridge University Press, 2019)
Articles and book chapters:
"Is One More Powerful with Numbers on One's Side?" (with Niko Kolodny), Journal of Political Philosophy, accepted for publication.
"Domination in Majoritarian Democracy." In The Oxford Handbook of Republicanism. Eds. Frank Lovett and Tim Sellars. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming.
"The Stability of the Just Society: Why Fixed Point Theorems Are Beside The Point" (with David Wiens), Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22(3) (2022): 312--319.
“Three errors about republicanism: a reply to Jafarov and Huseynli” (with Frank Lovett) Journal of Political Power 15(2) (2022): 235--242.
"Representative Democracy and Social Equality," American Political Science Review 116(2) (2022): 689--701.
"Domination and Democratic Legislation" (with Frank Lovett), Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 21(2) (2022): 97--121.
"Demographic objections to epistocracy: a generalization" (with David Wiens), Philosophy & Public Affairs 49(4) (2021): 323–349.
"Republican Freedom, Popular Control, and Collective Action'' (with Frank Lovett), American Journal of Political Science 63(4) (2019): 774-787.
"Why Arrow's Theorem Matters for Political Theory Even If Preference Cycles Never Occur," Public Choice 179(1) (2019): 97--111.
"Can Deliberative Minipublics Influence Public Opinion? Theory and Evidence" (with Ines Levin) Political Research Quarterly 71(3) (2018): 654--667.
"Effects of Deliberative Minipublics on Public Opinion: Experimental Evidence from a Survey on Social Security Reform" (with Ines Levin) International Journal of Public Opinion Research 30(1) (2018): 51--78.
"Popular Rule in Schumpeter's Democracy," Political Studies 64(4) (2016): 1071--1087.
"Social Choice and Popular Control", Journal of Theoretical Politics 28(2) (2016): 331--349.
"Theorems and Models in Political Theory: An Application to Pettit on Popular Control", The Good Society 24(1) (2015): 98--117.
"Disagreement and Epistemic Arguments for Democracy", Politics, Philosophy & Economics 12(2) (May, 2013): 135--154.
Rule by Multiple Majorities: A New Theory of Popular Control (Cambridge University Press, 2019)
Articles and book chapters:
"Is One More Powerful with Numbers on One's Side?" (with Niko Kolodny), Journal of Political Philosophy, accepted for publication.
"Domination in Majoritarian Democracy." In The Oxford Handbook of Republicanism. Eds. Frank Lovett and Tim Sellars. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming.
"The Stability of the Just Society: Why Fixed Point Theorems Are Beside The Point" (with David Wiens), Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22(3) (2022): 312--319.
“Three errors about republicanism: a reply to Jafarov and Huseynli” (with Frank Lovett) Journal of Political Power 15(2) (2022): 235--242.
"Representative Democracy and Social Equality," American Political Science Review 116(2) (2022): 689--701.
"Domination and Democratic Legislation" (with Frank Lovett), Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 21(2) (2022): 97--121.
"Demographic objections to epistocracy: a generalization" (with David Wiens), Philosophy & Public Affairs 49(4) (2021): 323–349.
"Republican Freedom, Popular Control, and Collective Action'' (with Frank Lovett), American Journal of Political Science 63(4) (2019): 774-787.
"Why Arrow's Theorem Matters for Political Theory Even If Preference Cycles Never Occur," Public Choice 179(1) (2019): 97--111.
"Can Deliberative Minipublics Influence Public Opinion? Theory and Evidence" (with Ines Levin) Political Research Quarterly 71(3) (2018): 654--667.
"Effects of Deliberative Minipublics on Public Opinion: Experimental Evidence from a Survey on Social Security Reform" (with Ines Levin) International Journal of Public Opinion Research 30(1) (2018): 51--78.
"Popular Rule in Schumpeter's Democracy," Political Studies 64(4) (2016): 1071--1087.
"Social Choice and Popular Control", Journal of Theoretical Politics 28(2) (2016): 331--349.
"Theorems and Models in Political Theory: An Application to Pettit on Popular Control", The Good Society 24(1) (2015): 98--117.
"Disagreement and Epistemic Arguments for Democracy", Politics, Philosophy & Economics 12(2) (May, 2013): 135--154.
